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Article 4

NOT GUILTY, AGAIN
CHASE DOSCHER1

I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

FOUNDATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER
DOCTRINE
HISTORY OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES
THE YATES MEMORANDUM
THE IMPACT OF THE YATES MEMORANDUM
CONSIDERATIONS TO COMBAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE
YATES MEMORANDUM
INTRODUCTION

Historically, there has been little incentive for healthcare and
pharmaceutical corporations to adhere strictly to federal
administrative regulations. The monetary penalties, while in the
billions of dollars, have paled in comparison to the profits reaped by
the unlawful marketing, off-label usages, and fraudulent billing to
federal healthcare programs. In 2015, former Attorney General,
Sally Yates, issued the now famous Yates Memorandum to take the
first step in curbing this trend of corporate misconduct. Through this
memorandum, the Department of Justice reaffirmed its commitment
to prosecuting not only corporations, but to hold their executives
personally liable for regulatory violations committed under their
watch. On paper, this is an attainable goal. In reality, federal
prosecutors have been faced with seemingly insurmountable
difficulties of proving executive intent and knowledge, overcoming
attorney-client corporate privilege, and ultimately, convincing juries
that are reluctant to convict corporate individuals for the crimes of
their company. This note will examine the history of criminal
prosecution of corporate executives which gave rise to the need for
the Yates Memorandum, it will analyze the Yates Memorandum and
explore the expanding impact of the document, and, finally, discuss
1
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potential solutions to the numerous challenges faced by federal
prosecutors in accomplishing the goals of the Yates Memorandum.
This Note will argue that despite the mounting challenges of
implementation and prosecution of corporate officers, there are
viable solutions to give teeth to the original purpose of the Yates
Memorandum and curb corporate misconduct.
I. FOUNDATION OF THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER
DOCTRINE
The “Responsible Corporate Officer” doctrine (RCO
doctrine), also described as the “crime of doing nothing,”2 is a
procedural process that regulators and Federal prosecutors are now
applying against corporate executives in administrative, civil, and
even criminal actions.3 The RCO doctrine is aptly categorized as a
crime of doing nothing because, at its core, the doctrine focuses on
the “person’s position in an entity as the basis for imposing liability
and not whether he or she had a culpable intent, was aware of any
wrongdoing, or had any direct involvement whatsoever.”4 More
recently, courts are applying the theory of liability in the public
health and welfare context.5 It has been expanded in scope to
encapsulate a wider range of regulatory violations and crimes.
Along with a wider scope comes a wider range of applications that
can result in harsher, criminal exposure for individuals.
Today, the Responsible Corporate Officer doctrine effects
not only the top brass of the corporate suite, but reaches out to a
wide range of corporate management. The RCO doctrine can impose
felony criminal charges on officers and exposure for the acts of their
subordinates within the corporation. This reality remains true even
though the officer did not intend for the bad acts to occur or was
consciously aware of the regulations that were being violated.6
Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court stated in
Morissette v. United States, “[c]rime, as a compound concept,
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning
mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense
2

Brent J. Gurney, et al., Commentary, The Crime of Doing Nothing: Strict Liability for
Corporate Officers Under the FDCA, 22 Andrews Litigation Reporter 1 (West 2007),
available at
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/Editorial/
Publication/The%20Crime%20of%20Doing%20Nothing.pdf.
3
M.E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, Duane Morris LLP (Jan. &
Feb. 2012),
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/clark_healthcarecompliance_0112.pdf..
4
Id. at 5.
5
D.E. Frulla, et al., Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Strict Criminal Liability for
Regulatory Violations, Kelley Drye (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1771/_pdf/style=pdf/articles_1771.pdf.
6
Id.
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individualism and took deep and early root in American Soil.”7 It is
important to note the deviation from the historical notion of criminal
prosecution in American jurisprudence. The vast majority of
criminal offenses require the unity of the bad act, actus reus, and
bad intent, mens rea. Here, however, the legislature has created a
discrete subset of offenses based on violation of administrative
regulation relating to public health and welfare. These offenses,
notably, lack the mens rea elements, but instead operate as strict
liability offenses.8 The RCO doctrine is not a newcomer to
American jurisprudence, but instead has been a slow build from its
incipience in United States v. Dotterweich.
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court, in United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), granted certiorari to address
whether a corporate executive had to have personal knowledge of
regulatory violations to be held criminally responsible.9 The
defendant was the president of a corporation which purchased drugs
from manufacturers, repackaged them, and then shipped them out to
physicians under their corporate label.10 On at least two occasions,
the labels for the drugs were incorrect and thus the corporation was
prosecuted for criminal violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 301-392. At the end of the proceedings,
the jury reached their verdict in which they acquitted the
corporation, but found Dotterweich guilty. He was sentenced to
probation for 60-days and a fine.
The United States Supreme Court upheld his conviction and
stated, “legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for
criminal conduct – an awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest
of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a
person otherwise innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a
public danger.”11 The Supreme Court’s impact went far beyond the
holding in this singular case. Their reasoning stated that “Congress
could place a great burden on corporate officers to comply with
regulation that directly affect public health and welfare.12 Criminal
liability, for the violation of an administrative regulation, stretches
to all those having “such a responsible share in the furtherance of
the transaction which the statute outlaws.”13 The next stage in the
development of the RCO doctrine came into being when the
Supreme Court decided Morissette v. United States.
Justice Jackson, in Morissette, stated technological and
society advances following the Industrial Revolution have yielded,
7

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1952).
Id.
9
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).
10
Id. at 281.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 284-85.
13
See Gurney, supra note 2, at 3 (citing Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284).
8
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“dangers [that] have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public
health, safety or welfare.” 342 U.S. at 253-54. “Justice Jackson
further explained, ‘[m]any of those are not in the nature of positive
aggression or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt,
but are in the nature of neglect where a duty requires care, or
inaction where it imposes a duty.’”14 However, the Morissette Court
was prudent to limit this new category of offenses to misdemeanors,
with little to no risk of incarceration, rather than more serious felony
offenses.15
Finally, the Supreme Court decided the seminal case of
United States v. Park in 1975. In Park the Court, as in Dotterweich,
faced a violation of FDCA. Park was the CEO of a national food
chain. Over the course of three years, FDA inspectors found
repeated contamination in several of the company’s food storage
warehouses. Both the company and Park were charged with five
misdemeanor counts under § 301(k) for causing the adulteration of
food products being stored for later sale. The company plead guilty,
but Park decided to go to trial. The trial court instructed the jury that
in order to find Park guilty, the jury must find that he had “a
responsible relationship” to the sanitary conditions in the company’s
warehouses16. Further, the trial court stated that the primary question
before the jury was whether Park, “by virtue of his position in the
company, had a position of authority and responsibility in the
situation out of which the charges arose.”17 The jury convicted Park
of all counts. Following a reversal by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s jury
instructions noting that the “FDCA imposes not only a positive duty
to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also and
primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that
violations will not occur.”18 The Court concluded that “the
government established a prima facie case… when it introduced
evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of facts that the
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation,
responsibility and authority to prevent in the first instance, or
promptly correct, the violation complained of, and that he failed to
do so.”19 In accordance with Park, and the RCO doctrine, a court
could impute knowledge of administrative regulation, for strict
liability offenses, and impose the corporate subordinate acts upon
14

Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 256.
Id. at 273.
16
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 665 (1975).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 672.
19
Id. at 673-74.
15
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the responsible officer. Despite the growth in scope of the RCO
doctrine, the Supreme Court has held firm to Morissette in that when
an offense is punishable by a felony, the court should not presume
knowledge on the defendant. “[T]hat because a felony carries a
much harsher stigma, a court should be careful not to dispose of a
felony mens rea requirement on the same basis as when applying the
RCO doctrine.20” Currently, the federal government utilizes the
RCO doctrine in an effort to change corporate culture and steer
corporate conduct away from habitual regulation violations21. In
addition to levied charges, there has been a marked increase in the
scale and in the amount of financial settlements, civil penalties, and
criminal charges levied against both healthcare and pharmaceutical
corporations and individual executives.
II. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PENALTIES
The inability of paltry financial penalties to serve as a
deterrent to further wrongdoing heightens the importance of other
enforcement avenues.22 However, despite the plethora of
settlements reached with the pharmaceutical industry under the
False Claims Act (FCA), Department of Justice (DOJ) has, with a
few exceptions, not held company heads accountable for overseeing
the fraudulent activities at issue in the settlements.23
Public Citizen reported that in the period of 1991 through
2015 there were 329 reported civil settlements, 35 civil-criminal
settlements, and nine reported criminal settlements with $28 billion
in civil penalties and $7.8 billion in criminal penalties.24 All of the
reported criminal penalties, from 1991 through 2015, were federal
and decreased exponentially over the last two years.25 When
considered in totality between federal and state settlements, there
was a total of 373 between 1991 through 2015. These settlements
reached a total amount of roughly $35.7 billion. In 2012-13,
combined criminal penalties totaled $7.2 billion but by 2014-15, the
total had decreased 98% to just $44 million. There were two “civilcriminal settlements” in 2014-15, down from nine in the previous
year, and there have been no reported criminal settlements since
2012.26
20

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994).
See Frulla, supra note 5.
22
Sammy Almashat, M.D., M.P.H., et al., Twenty-Five Years of Pharmaceutical Industry
Criminal and Civil Penalties: 1991 Through 2015, PUBLICCITIZEN, at 25 (Mar. 31, 2016),
available at https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/publiccitizenpharmasettlements1991-2015-chartbook.pdf.
23
Id. at 25.
24
Id. at 10.
25
Id.
26
Id.
21
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In the time period studied, Public Citizen totaled the amount
of federal settlements at $31.9 billion, with just $2.4 billion in
federal penalties recovered in 2014 and 2015. This amount, while
substantial, is significantly reduced from the amount recovered in
2012-2013, $8.7 billion. Likewise, the number of settlements
decreased in the same time period from 22 in 2012-2013 to 19
settlements in 2014-2015, with each averaging out to $395 million
per settlement.27 It is important to note that half of the recovered
settlements in 2014-2015, roughly $1.2 billion was due to one case
in which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled with Teva
over alleged monopolistic practices28. Among the reported federal
settlements, the False Claims Act was the most commonly invoked
law in civil settlements, while the FDCA was the most commonly
invoked law in criminal prosecution. Out of all the federal
prosecutions, qui tam (whistleblower) revelations amounted for 81
of 140 (58%) of all federal settlements and $22.8 of $31.9 billion
(71%) of recovered penalties.
Through the end of 2014, the following cases resulted in
guilty pleas by, or convictions of, executives of pharmaceutical
companies. In 2007, three executives from Purdue Pharma pled
guilty to “deceiving doctors and patients about the risks of lucrative
painkiller Oxycontin” and paid a fine of $34.5 million29. In 2009,
Former InterMune CEO, Scott Harkonen, was convicted for
approving a press release which advertised Actimmune, one of the
company’s drugs, for off-label uses. Harkonen was sentenced to sixmonths home confinement and forced to pay $20,000 in fines30. In
the same year, Thomas Farina and Mary Holloway, both operated as
sales representatives for Pfizer, were convicted for promoting the
painkiller Bextra for off-label uses. Farina was sentenced to six
months of home confinement and Holloway to two-years probation
and a $75,000 fine31. Finally, in 2011, former KV Pharmaceuticals
CEO, Marc Hermelin, pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges
under the FDCA and was ordered to pay the amount of $1.9 million
in fines and forfeitures and sentenced to 30-days in prison, of which

27

Id. at 8.
Id.
29
Barry Meier. In Guilty Plea, OxyContin Maker to Pay $600 Million, N.Y. TIMES (May
10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/business/11drug-web.html.
30
Greg Stohr. Ex-InterMune CEO Harkonen’s Conviction Let Stand by Court,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/201312-16/ex-intermune-ceo-harkonen-s-conviction-let-stand-by-court.
31
Jim Edwards, Pfizer Exec Gets 6 Months’ Home Confinement for Off-Label Bextra
Sales, CBS. NEWS (last updated July 20, 2009.), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/pfizerexec-gets-6-months-home-confinement-for-off-label-bextra-sales.
28
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he served 15, for “failing to report that some of his company’s
tablets were oversized and possibly dangerous.”32
These reported data sets can only be considered to be the
Olympics of corporate wrongdoing and settlements in the studied
time period of 1991 through 2015. In that period, GlaxoSmithKline
and Pfizer took gold and silver medals with $7.9 and $3.9 billion in
settlements respectively. Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Abbott, Eli
Lilly, Teva, Shering-Plough, Novartis, and AstraZeneca took home
bronze and received honorable mentions with each paying penalties
of at least $1 billion in the same time period. To the average person,
settlements of this magnitude would appear to be enough to curb any
future corporate wrongdoing, but this is not the case. In the time
period covered in this study, the total financial penalties totaled
roughly $35.7 billion. Consider that amount in comparison to the
realized net profits of only the 11 largest pharmaceutical companies,
$711 billion33. The amounts faced by corporations simply is not
enough to deter the alleged regulatory violations. Consider the
largest reported single settlement in the study.
GlaxoSmithKline paid $3 billion for violations involving
multiple of drugs. “On just the three drugs involved in the criminal
plea agreement – Paxil, Wellbutrin SR, and Avandia –
GlaxoSmithKline made $28 billion in sales, or nine times the total
fines for all implicated products in the settlement.”34 The amount of
penalties, even considering the largest monetary penalty faced, are
doing little to curb regulatory violations or incentivize complete
compliance with administrative regulation. Criminal prosecution of
corporate executive and other employees resulting in prison
sentences for the most egregious violations may be necessary and
thus set the stage for Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates to issue
her September 9, 2015 memorandum.
III. THE YATES MEMORANDUM
In response to the growing concerns that pure financial
penalties and settlements were doing little to effectively curb
wrongdoing by healthcare and pharmaceutical corporations, Deputy
Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates, on September 9, 2015,
issued a memorandum on Individual Accountability for Corporate

32

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Drug Company Executive Pleads Guilty
in Oversized Drug Tablets Case (last updated Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-drug-company-executive-pleads-guilty-oversizeddrug-tablets-case.
33
See Almashat, supra note 22, at 23.
34
Id. at 23-24.
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Wrongdoing.35 The purpose of this memorandum was simple. Yates
stated “Our nation’s economy depends on effective enforcement of
the civil and criminal laws that protect our financial system and, by
extension, all our citizens…One of the most effective ways to
combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.” 36 Accountability of
corporate executives, those who perpetrate, or should have known
to prevent such wrongdoing, is important for several reasons. First,
as Yates stated, accountability deters future illegal activity. It
incentivizes changes in corporate behavior. It ensures that proper
parties are held responsible for their actions. Finally, and most
importantly, accountability promotes the public’s confidence in our
justice system.
The challenge in realizing the goals set forth in this
memorandum lie in that, in large corporations, responsibility can be
diffuse and decisions are made throughout the corporations and at
all levels of managerial authority. In such situations, it can be, and
is, difficult to determine if an individual possessed the knowledge
and requisite criminal intent to establish them personally “guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.”37 This challenge is particularly true in
regards to high level executives, who are often well insulated from
the day-to-day operations of the corporation in which many of the
violations occur.
The Yates Memorandum set out the framework from which
federal prosecutors may face these challenges head on. Six key steps
have been formulated to “strengthen [the] pursuit of individual
corporate wrongdoing.” First, in order to qualify for any cooperation
credit, “typically consists of reduced fines in civil or administrative
cases or potential shorter sentences in criminal cases”38,
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts
relating to the individual responsible for the misconduct as criminal
and civil investigations should focus on individuals from their
inception. Criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate
investigations should be in routine communications with one
another. Absent extraordinary circumstances or approved
departmental policy, the Department will not release culpable
individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a matter
with a corporation. Department attorneys should not resolve matters
35

Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015),
http://src.bna.com/hg.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Jonathan C. Schwartz & David G. Buffa, Cooperation Credit in Enforcement
Proceedings: The Importance of Independence, A.B.A. (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/commercial/articles/summer20160816-cooperation-credit-enforcement-proceedings-importance-of-independence.html.
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with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual
cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals in
such cases. Finally, civil attorneys should consistently focus on
individuals as well as the company and evaluate whether to bring
suit against an individual based on consideration beyond that
individual’s ability to pay.39
The government’s twin aims of this memorandum, of
returning government money to the public and to hold the
wrongdoers accountable and deter future violative actions, are
equally important. However, the twin aims can come into apparent
tension when a federal prosecutor is determining whether to levy
civil charges against an individual who may not have sufficient
personal resources to pay any financial penalty imposed. The goal
of individual accountability supersedes the individual’s ability to
pay. Yates clearly stated that, “[p]ursuit of civil actions against
culpable individuals should not be governed solely by those
individuals’ ability to pay.
In other words, the fact that an individual may not have
sufficient resources to satisfy a significant judgment should not
control the decision on whether to bring suit. Rather, Department
attorneys should consider the following factors. First, was the
individual’s misconduct serious? Second, if so, is the misconduct
actionable? Third, will the evidence admissible against the
individual “probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a
judgment.”40 Finally, ask whether pursuing the charge reflects an
important federal interest.41 Only by seeking to hold all individuals
accountable, in view of the above mentioned factors, can the
Department of Justice ensure that it is “doing everything in its power
to minimize corporate fraud, and, over the course of time, minimize
losses to the public fisc through fraud.42
Under this new approach by the Department of Justice and
Office of the Attorney General, corporations face increased pressure
to comply with administrative regulations. Instead of the
corporation and executives facing solely monetary penalties, and
potential exclusion from participation in the Medicare and
Medicaid, now corporate executives face potential criminal charges
resulting in prison sentences. All of these measures are designed to
deter future wrongdoing, incentivize long overdue changes to
corporate behavior, and ensure that the proper parties are held
responsible for violations. Just as Former Deputy General Yates
stated, “Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that
39

Yates, supra note 35, at 2-3.
Id. at 7.
41
Id.
42
Id.
40
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one’s criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was
committed on behalf of a corporation.”43 The impact of the
memorandum was almost immediate with the first prosecution
coming a short seven weeks after the publication of the
memorandum.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE YATES MEMORANDUM
The Yates memorandum serves an important purpose in
helping shape the future of corporate conduct, and specifically the
future compliance with administrative regulation. As Eric Holder,
Former Attorney General of the United States, stated, “few things
discourage criminal activity at a firm – or incentivize changes in
corporate behavior – like the prospect of individual decision makers
being held accountable.”44 While corporations can plead guilty and
have their stock prices return to profitable levels in a matter of time,
executives that plead guilty can face years of incarceration. The
Yates Memorandum marks a notable shift in policy. Executives can
no longer protect themselves behind the veil of corporate limited
liability, but instead face the full force of punishment both their
personal and their corporation’s wrongdoing.45 The impact of the
Yates memo, and challenges faced by federal prosecutors, will be
examined in four notable cases.
Historically, the Department of Justice punished healthcare
and pharmaceutical companies with mammoth financial
settlements, without actually holding the individuals charged with
responsibility of such companies accountable. This was true until
October, 29, 2015. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of
Massachusetts announced that they had formally arrested the former
president of Warner Chilcott, W. Carl Reichel on an indictment of
conspiring to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.46 The indictment
charged Reichel with an allegedly integral role in Warner Chilcott’s
43

Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates Delivers Remarks
at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liberty in
Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-deliversremarks-new-york-university-school.
44
Eric Holder, Attorney General Holder Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at
NYU School of Law, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 17, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-remarks-financial-fraudprosecutions-nyu-school-law.
45
Dustin Aponte, et al., The Yates Memo and Big Pharma: Individual Prosecutions for
Corporate Misconduct, ABA (Sept. 12, 2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/health/articles/summer2016-0916yates-memo-big-pharma-individual-prosecutions-corporate-misconduct.html.
46
Gary Giampetruzzi, Not Guilty, Again: Individual Corporate Liability in the Wake of
the Reichel Acquittal, PAUL HASTINGS LLP (June 22, 2016),
https://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=6cc9e969-2334-6428-811cff00004cbded.
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scheme to pay kickbacks, in the form of speaker fees, dinners, and
other remunerations, for high volume of prescription of the
company’s drugs.47 However, on the same day that the U.S.
Attorney’s Office announced the arrest of Reichel, the office also
announced that Warner Chilcott would pay a reported $125 million
to settle both the civil claims and criminal charges levied against
them.48
The impact of the Yates memorandum is clear. In this
instance, the corporation has formally settled the charges against it
for a monetary penalty, but the U.S. Attorney’s Office continues to
pursue independent criminal charges against the executive for his
personal role in the wrongdoings. In announcing such an
independent indictment, U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz stated the
indictment “demonstrate[s] that the government will seek not only
to hold companies accountable, but will identify and charge
corporate officials responsible for the fraud.”49
At trial, the government asserted that there were two Warner
Chilcott corporation, “one on paper that followed the law, and one
which Reichel directed, that broke the law.”50 The government
offered the testimony of ten former Warner Chilcott employees,
several had pled guilty to federal charges and entered into plea
agreements to cooperate with the government in exchange for the
government’s recommendation that they receive lighter sentences.51
Several of the witnesses testified to providing kickbacks to
prescribing physicians and that it was Reichel who truly directed the
operation.52 Additionally, the government stated that they wished to
have the jury instructed on willful blindness in that “would have
allowed [the jury] to find that Reichel knew a fact if he ‘deliberately
closed his eyes to a fact that otherwise would have been obvious to
him.’”53 Reichel objected and the court sustained in favor of jury
instructions that read:
Since an essential element of the offense is that it be
undertaken “knowingly” and “willfully,” it follows
47

Indictment ¶ 9, United States v. Reichel, No. 1 1:15cr10324 (D. Mass. 2016).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Warner Chilcott Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Health Care
Fraud Scheme, (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/warner-chilcott-agreesplead-guilty-felony-health-care-fraud-scheme-and-pay-125-million.) [hereinafter
“Warner Chilcott Pleads”].
49
Indictment ¶ 9, United States v. Reichel, No. 1 1:15cr10324 (D. Mass. 2016).
50
See Giampetruzzi, supra note 46 (citing Brian Amaral, Bribery Case Against ExWarner Chilcott Exec Heads to Jury, LAW 360 (June 16, 2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/807929/bribery-case-against-ex-warner-chilcott-execheads-to-jury).
51
See Warner Chilcott Pleads, supra note 48.
52
See Giampetruzzi, supra note 46.
53
Government’s Proposed Instructions No. 21, United States v. Reichel, No 1:15cr10324
(D. Mass. 2016)).
48
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that good faith on the defendant is a complete
defense. It is for you to decide whether or not the
defendant acted in good faith, but if you decide that
at all relevant times he acted in good faith, it is your
duty to acquit him.54
Over the next two days, the jury deliberated and ultimately
acquitted Reichel of all charges.55 As one commentator pointed out,
“Had he been convicted, Reichel faced up to five years’
imprisonment and mandatory exclusion from all federal healthcare
benefit programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid.”56 He further
stated, “In a case that everyone seemed to be watching, and had a
Yates imprint all over it, the government had come up short against
an individual.”57 This case is a clear demonstration of the challenged
faced by federal prosecutors in charging corporate individuals as
they bear the burden of proof to establish both the executive’s
knowledge and his or her intent to break the law. Despite this
setback, the Department of Justice will not forgo prosecution of
corporate executives, but will instead work to improve the quality
of their evidence and sources of information, primarily the mandated
corporate cooperation.58
In a similar case, GeneScience Pharmaceutical was
investigated for a period of three years and ultimately was charged,
along with the founder, Lei Jin.59 GeneScience pled guilty to a
felony charge of illegally distributing human growth hormone in the
United States.60 GeneScience was sentenced to pay a settlement of
$3 million towards a clean competition fund, which supports drugfree sports, and $7.2 million in criminal forfeitures.61 However, Lei
Jin entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 5 years’ probation.62
Another challenge faced by the Department of Justice when
prosecuting corporate executives is not only the burden of proof, but
also overcoming the hurdle of the attorney-client privilege. In 2011,
GlaxoSmithKline made headlines when they agreed to plead guilty
and pay a record $3 billion to resolve fraud allegations and failure
to report safety data.63 In addition to corporate responsibility,
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prosecutors alleged that a high-ranking attorney obstructed an FDA
investigation into whether the company marketed one of their antidepressant drugs, Wellbutrin SR, for the off-label use of weight
loss.64 Prosecution alleged that the attorney made false statements
during an investigation in which she denied having any knowledge
that the company was promoting the drug for such uses.65 The
difficulty arises when prosecutors are attempting to prosecute an
attorney representing a client for a criminal offense because the bulk
of the communications between the attorney and client are
privileged and cannot be compelled for disclosure. “While there
have been a few drug company executives who have pled guilty to
criminal and/or civil charges relating to the unlawful marketing of a
product, this strategy of suing corporate executives, who almost
always rely on the advice of their attorneys, is very problematic.”66
Following the Warner Chilcott case, federal prosecutors
filed suit in a Massachusetts federal court against William Facteau,
former CEO of Acclarent, and Patrick Fabian, former Vice President
of Sales. Like many others, this case arose out of a qui tam suit filed
under the federal False Claims Act by a former sales representative
who worked for Acclarent from 2007 to 2011.67 The relator alleges
that Acclarent received FCA clearance for its “Relieva Stratus
MicroFlow Spacer” (Stratus) device, a device which utilized saline
to open a patient’s sinuses following surgery.68 However, allegedly,
this was not the true purpose of this device. Following FDA
clearance, Facteau and Fabian intended to use Stratus as a drugdelivery device and marketed Stratus for that purpose even after, in
2007, when the FDA rejected the request to promote Stratus for such
purposes.69 Following this rejection, the relator alleged that between
2008 and 2011, Facteau and Fabian engaged in a scheme to develop
and marked Stratus rapidly in order to generate sales and make the
company, Acclarent, an overall desirable target for acquisition or an
IPO.70
The relator further alleged that, as part of the scheme, sales
employees were praised promotion and trained only in the off-label
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use of the Stratus device and were encourages to discuss with
physicians the benefits of the off-label uses of the device with
steroids.71 Their efforts paid off and made them a desirable target
for acquisition when in 2010, Johnson & Johnson acquired
Acclarent for $785 million.72 Despite being told to discontinue the
promotion of the Stratus device for off-label uses, Acclarent
continued to promote the device and ultimately allegedly caused
several doctors and other health care providers to bill federal health
care programs for unapproved uses of the device. In May 2013,
Acclarent made the decision to discontinue the use of the Stratus
device.
Despite discontinuing the device, both Facteau and Fabian
were indicted for “felony wire fraud and conspiracy, as well as a
number of misdemeanor counts related to introducing a misbranded
and adulterated device into interstate commerce.”73 The prosecution
argued, at trial, that the two parties hid the truth of their device’s
purpose from the FDA. The defense countered, and jury agreed, that
they had not hid the truth, but had rather applied for several years to
have the off-label use cleared by the FDA, but had not received any
approval beyond the initial saline use. The jury agreed and acquitted
them of the singular felony charge. “Facteau and Fabian did not
escape trial unscathed, however, and were convicted on 10
misdemeanor counts of introducing a misbranded and adulterated
device into interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.” 74 Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay $18
million to resolve any civil allegations that it caused health care
providers to submit false claims to the federal health care programs.
In the most recent, and ongoing, development of the Yates
memorandum, a former senior executive of Tenet Healthcare Corp,
John Holland, has been indicted on charges of participation in a
scheme to bribe physicians for patient referrals, enabling the
healthcare corporation to fraudulently bill Medicaid programs in
excess of $400 million.75 Holland was senior vice president for
Tenet’s southern states between 2006 and 2013 and has been
accused by federal prosecutors of paying $12 million in kickbacks
to Clinica de la Mama, a clinic serving predominately
undocumented pregnant women in Georgia and South Carolina. In
these states, the clinic referred expecting mothers to local Tenet
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hospitals. In return, Tenet would bill Medicaid, and in some cases,
Medicare, for the total of $149 million in reimbursement from the
referrals.76 The indictment also alleges that Holland falsified
compliance reports to the Department of Health and Human
Services, violating Tenets previous 2006 settlement agreement in
which Tenet agreed to pay $900 million for over inflating charges
to Medicaid. Holland, facing four charges of mail fraud, health care
fraud, and major fraud against the United States plead not guilty in
federal court in Miami.
Holland is likely the first of several managers and executives
at Tenet Healthcare to be charged. In the past year, Tenet Healthcare
reached a $514 million settlement to resolve the criminal and civil
claims that came from a whistle-blower lawsuit filed more than 10
years ago. Richard Deane, attorney for Holland, stated that“[t]he
allegations relate to contracts from more than 10 years ago that were
openly reviewed and approved at multiple levels of the company,
including by their lawyers, was released on a $3 million bond late
Wednesday.”77 If convicted, John Holland could face up to 50 years
in prison with his homes in Dallas and Park City also facing seizure.
However, Holland’s attorney believes that his client is innocent, that
the jury will find him so, and “the company’s resolution”, of the
issue, “should have ended the matter.”78 Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Blanco said that the “charges underscore our continued
commitment to holding both individuals and corporations
accountable for the fraudulent conduct. We will follow the evidence
where it takes us, including to the corporate executive ranks.”79
Although juries have not entirely sides against corporate executives
in the various cases and charges levied against them, considered
together, they raise questions about the willingness of juries to hold
individuals personally accountable for the actions or wrongdoings
of their companies, despite the government’s “recommitment to
prosecuting individual’s as professed in the Yates Memo.”80
V. CONSIDERATIONS TO COMBAT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF
THE YATES MEMORANDUM
Laws without teeth are merely words. Historically, monetary
penalties have done little to effectively curb the trend of corporate
violation of federal administrative regulation from the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act to the Anti-Kickback Statute. The billions
76

Id.
Former Tenet Vice President Faces Prison Time for Role in $400 Million Scheme,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 1, 2017)
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170201/NEWS/170209987.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
77

57

NOT GUILTY, AGAIN

VOL. I

imposed as federal sanctions are written off as insignificant means
to reach the end of realized exponential profits. The Yates
Memorandum is sound in both idea and scope, but the goals and
language have not been effectuated in the most efficient ways. The
number of corporate senior executives that have been charged
individually following the memo has grown. However, the number
of convictions of criminal charges is small. It is more likely that a
middle manager or sales representative will face the full force of
criminal charges, and even jail sentences, than the majority of
charged senior executives.
The state of American healthcare and regulation is always in
flux, but that has never been truer than now. While we are in the
early stages of a new administration, it will be interesting, as time
goes on, to see the impacts that will be made on the prosecution of
corporate executives. The following are considerations on what
might be done to remedy the ineffectiveness found in the application
of the Yates Memorandum. Time will tell whether future
administrations will continue to pursue accountability by using the
same methods or if they will make changes, from minor to major, to
potentially empower prosecutors to fully perform all of the goals set
forth in the memorandum.
The first potential solution to accomplish the goals set forth
by the Yates memo is to further empower federal prosecutors. In
doing so, it would be necessary to call for further cooperation by
corporations involved in investigations. In order to qualify currently
for the cooperation credit, a corporation must disclose to the
Department of Justice all relevant facts about an individual’s
misconduct. “The company must identify any individuals involved
or otherwise responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of
their position, status, or seniority, and provide to the Department all
facts relating to that misconduct.”81 The revision should include
further calls for corporate transparency and full disclosure. Federal
prosecutors face the burden of often having to prove individual mens
rea and actus reus without all of the necessary facts and as their
cases have suffered as a result. By fully disclosing all relevant
information to the misconduct at hand, and employees who are
connected to such misconduct, federal prosecutors might be able to
build stronger cases reinforced by this additional evidence which
might be able to prove the intent and knowledge of corporate
executives.
By revising the current or issuing a new memorandum to
reflect this first proposal, federal prosecutors might be empowered
to overcome the challenges of acquiring sufficient evidence to hold
individual corporate executives accountable. With more access to
evidence, federal prosecutors will not only be able to better show
81
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the knowledge of misconduct or intent of the corporate executive,
but will also be able to better advocate their cause to the jury. As it
has been noted previously, juries have shown a hesitancy to convict
individuals for the wrongs of their companies. However, with
enough information, stemming from full and transparent
cooperation by corporations, juries will be better able to understand
the role that executives play in the misconduct or why they should
be held vicariously liable for the acts of the corporation that they
knew, or should have known, were illegal.
Finally, a more immediate proposal would be to revise the
Department of Justice’s approach to monetary penalties. If the
profits that can be made by the sale of pharmaceuticals or services
billable to federal healthcare programs can justify the financial
penalties imposed on the means utilized to realize them, as the cost
of doing business, then it would be wise for the Department of
Justice to seek, and impose, higher monetary settlement and
sanctions against these violative corporations. If evidence fails to
show cause or juries are too hesitant to hold individuals accountable
for the wrongdoings of the corporation, then, perhaps, it is best left
to the shareholders to rectify noncompliance. If the Department is
able to advocate for and impose far higher monetary penalties, then
it would be wise for shareholders, acting in the best interest of their
investments, to remove habitually offending executives and
managers who are threatening their return on investment by
continually incurring billions of dollars in settlements for regulatory
violations.

